Watch Criminals Before They Strike

In the wake of the North Hollywood shootout we hear a too-familiar story: that police caught the perpetrators seemingly red-handed in an earlier incident, but they received only light sentences. Once more, it seems the law has failed to protect us from known dangers.

But before we point fingers at lawyers and judges, we should consider whether the problem is systemic. The current legal system’s emphasis on reacting to serious crime has left insufficient resources for the proactive investigation and supervision of those involved in lesser offenses. We are poorly equipped to react to warnings like those given us by Larry Eugene Phillips Jr. and Emil Matasareanu in 1993.

In October 1993, Glendale police stopped a car with Phillips and Matasareanu in it for speeding. Police searched the car and found two AK-47 assault rifles, more than 1,000 rounds of ammunition, several handguns, bulletproof vests, police scanners, homemade explosives, masks, false mustaches, a stopwatch and gloves. Believing that the men had been planning robbery, the district attorney’s office filed felony charges against them for various weapons law violations and for conspiracy to rob. But additional investigation apparently turned up no information about particular robbery plans or links to criminal or terrorist groups. Nor did either man fit the usual profile of a dangerous robber. Phillips had a prior criminal record but almost entirely for nonviolent property offenses; Matasareanu had no record.

Believing, probably correctly, that it could not prove the most serious charge of conspiracy, the district attorney’s office agreed to a plea bargain: Phillips would plead to a felony and a misdemeanor, Matasareanu to a misdemeanor and an infraction. Both men received jail sentences that amounted to time served; Phillips was placed on probation.

With the benefit of hindsight, we can second-guess the handling of the case. But in a system with limited investigative resources and one that presumes innocence and focuses on actual deeds rather than suspected propensities, this was likely to be a frustrating case for law enforcement. The more important issue is what happened following the men’s release.

Let’s start with what should have happened. A probation officer should have monitored where they lived, whether and where they worked and checked to see that they did not acquire another arsenal. Information about the men should have been widely distributed to law enforcement agencies and at least one such agency should have taken responsibility for making periodic checks on the two.

Did any of this happen? Not likely. Phillips may have been on formal probation, but probation officers carry such high case loads that close supervision of this type of offender is almost impossible. Nor is it likely that any law enforcement agency regularly and vigorously investigated the pair’s activities. Who would take on the assignment? The men were stopped in Glendale, but it was not clear they were targeting that community. They apparently had lived in a number of places covered by different police departments. The FBI was perhaps the most logical agency, but in a region with an extraordinary number of bank robberies and other serious federal crimes, tracking two men because they potentially were dangerous would not be a high priority.

Would better follow-up have made a difference? Monitoring should have produced further warning signs. Without any apparent legitimate source of major income, the men were seen wearing expensive clothes and accessories, driving luxury cars. Where did the money come from? Perhaps if there were closer checking by law enforcement, the link between them and the 1995 San Fernando Valley bank robberies of which they are now suspected might have produced an early arrest.

Still, there are no guarantees. Phillips apparently was a canny and dedicated professional criminal who knew how to plan bold robberies and cover his tracks. But unless we emphasize more proactive methods, our chances of catching people like Phillips and Matasareanu before the shooting starts are much less than they should be.

So what should we do? We must re-create small community infrastructure in a mass, mobile society. In a small community, Phillips and Matasareanu would not simply disappear into the woodwork following discovery of their portable arsenal. Someone would keep tabs. But in a megalopolis, if we do not specifically assign someone the task of keeping an aggressive look-out, it won’t happen. Similarly, if we don’t fully fund probation departments so that they can do basic supervision for all significant criminal cases, then we lose that measure of protection as well.

Scared for our safety, we have built some of the biggest guns (prisons) that the world has ever seen, forgetting that smaller weapons, better aimed (proactive investigation and intervention) often provide more bang for the buck.